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Introduction 
With the revelations that many ISIS recruits are ex-offenders (Cottee 2016), prison and 
probation settings are on the frontline of counter-terrorism practice. The latest policy 
developments in Europe on managing radicalization and convicted terrorist-offenders in 
prison and post-release settings show some perhaps surprising recommendations: those built 
on a foundation of seeking to build trust, to recognize human dignity and equality, and a 
broader vision to reform offenders as citizens (Council of Europe 2016, United Nations 
October 2016, Williams 2017).  
Counter-terrorism practice, however, has often taken a strikingly different tone—one where 
the management of risk involves anticipating threat and intervening against citizens in a “pre-
crime” space of prevention (McCulloch and Pickering 2009). Distrust, rather than trust-
building, is emphasized. As a growing body of critical literature at the intersection of 
sociology, criminology and international relations has examined, counter-terrorism policies 
and practices have sought to achieve security through prevention and in a way that is harmful 
to Muslim and ethnic minority groups (McCulloch and Wilson 2016, Mythen and Walklate 
2016, Sentas 2014). Counter-radicalization efforts, these authors argue, and as I develop in 
this article, have eroded trust, dignity, and equality by marginalizing Muslim, ethnic minority 
and immigrant groups and creating “suspect communities”. 
What accounts for these contrasting means to achieving security? In this article, I examine 
the roots of social scientific expertise that underpin these contrasting perspectives. Following 
Kundnani (2012), I argue that the social science underpinning the concept of radicalization is 
driven by a risk-detection and pre-emptive logic of a psychological science that has severe 
policy and practice implications for particular communities. I argue instead for an expanded, 
sociologically-informed conceptual framework for thinking about security and insecurity. As 
demonstrated by emerging best practices among European prison and probation practitioners, 
such a framework for security would be built on trust-building, equality, and goals oriented to 
contributing to the well-being of individuals as citizens. 
I begin with a summary of dominant counter-radicalization logic around prevention. Then I 
explore its psychological underpinnings and the consequences for Muslim and ethnic 
minority groups. I conclude by reflecting on recent research that I conducted in two English 
high security prisons with colleagues (Liebling et al. 2015) and emerging European counter-
radicalization practices in order to prompt a rethinking of security and sources of expertise.  
Expertise and the “Pre-emptive creep” of Counter-terrorism 
The current counter-terrorism climate is characterized by a pre-emptive risk logic (Mythen 
and Walklate 2016). Since 9/11, measures to pre-empt terrorist attacks have grown. Arrests 
and prosecution for foreign travel have joined a number of legislative measures aimed at pre-
empting terrorism, including Control Orders in the UK and extended detention practices. 
Mythen and Walklate argue that these measures are underpinned not by the principle of 
prevention, but by the practice of pre-emption. Pre-emption reflects an anticipatory logic that 
is based not on the interpretation of the past but an anticipation of the future. It is a response 
to the question of “what if” and justifies actions “just in case” (2016). 
Critics have suggested that this anticipatory logic arises “from ill-thought through and hastily 
applied security-seeking practices” (Mythen and Walklate 2016, 1120) or from a secular 
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security habitus that reflects unconscious and unconsidered practice (Gutkowski 2014). 
Contrary to these views, and in line with Kundnani (2012), I propose that pre-emptive 
counter-terrorism is framed and authorized by predominantly psychologically-informed 
social scientific models of radicalization which are estranged from thinking about the 
broader, sociological significance of their models when put into policy and practice.  
Models of radicalization are characterized by a predominantly psychologically and social-
psychologically-informed approach common within the field of terrorism studies that 
responds to the question: “What leads a person to turn to political violence?” (Koomen and 
Van der Pligt 2016, 259). This approach takes cases of the “spectacular few” (Hamm 2013) 
and works through the privilege of hindsight to piece together the causes of an individuals’ 
behaviour after violence has occurred. Generalizations are then made from small numbers of 
individuals who committed acts of terrorism, and a social scientific research programme is 
borne out of a “systematic synthesis that incorporates as many as possible of the likely 
determinants and contextual factors relating to radicalization” (Koomen and Van der Pligt 
2016, 6). 
Kundnani observes that prior to 2001, the term radicalization was used informally to describe 
a shift towards more radical politics. After 2004, its use in academic journals surged and the 
term acquired a “new meaning of a psychological or theological process by which Muslims 
move towards extremist views” (Kundnani 2012, 7). The term is now widely recognized to 
refer to the processes that “could lead to acts of terrorism” (Alonso, Bjørgo, and Porta 2008, 
5). As Peter Neumann has observed, the term refers to “what goes on before the bomb goes 
off” (Neumann, 4). This shift in meaning is highlighted in an early but influential research 
report conducted for the New York Police Department: 
Where once we would have defined the initial indicator of the threat at the point 
where a terrorist or group of terrorists would actually plan an attack, we have now 
shifted our focus to a much earlier point—a point where we believe the potential 
terrorist or group of terrorists begin and progress through a process of radicalization. 
The culmination of this process is a terrorist attack. (Silber and Bhatt 2007, 14) 
Writing in 2007, the report highlights a new counter-terrorism mandate that seeks to prevent 
terrorism at a “much earlier point”. Knowledge of these earlier points follow from an ongoing 
curation of case studies of terrorists and a mobilization of social scientific theories and 
findings that supplies a knowledge base into the antecedents, or process, leading up to a 
terrorist attack. This knowledge base is produced by experts and consumed by practitioners 
and policy-makers. A complex “relationship between terrorism experts’ and the actions of 
states” exists (Burnett and Whyte 2003), and this expertise is informed in significant ways by 
the social sciences.  
If a set of religious [and social and psychological] factors can be identified that 
terrorists share with a wider group of radicals, but which “moderate” Muslims reject, 
then a model can be developed in which such beliefs are seen as “indicators” of 
radicalization, a point along a pathway to becoming a terrorist. (Kundnani 2012, 9) 
The pre-emptive creep is most dramatically illustrated in counter-terrorism practices directed 
towards Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) initiatives and “prevention” practices. In the 
English context, the Prevent strategy is directed across a range of institutions and to 
individuals considered “vulnerable” to violent extremism. The Prevent strategy was 
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inaugurated after the 7 July 2005 attacks on the London Transport System with a broad 
mandate “to stop people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism” (Home Office 2011). 
Prevention activities cover a broad remit. I recall attending a Prevent annual meeting in 2009 
in Birmingham, where delegates passed out magazines promoting Islamic fashion and hip 
hop, citizenship training was on offer, and Islamic cultural activities were promoted alongside 
various policing divisions. The securitization of Muslims and Islam was vividly on display.  
The now statutory duty to spot signs of “non-violent extremism” in the UK, known 
ominously as the “Prevent duty”, is the latest in this trajectory. Under section 26 of the 
Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015, local authorities, childcare providers, schools, 
further and higher education institutions, the NHS, the police, prison and young offender 
institution governors, and providers of probation services, must have “due regard to the need 
to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism” (Department of Education June 2015). 
The controversy around this duty is well-documented in the media, and includes examples of 
unassuming Muslim students being questioned about reading materials when those materials 
are for university courses (Ramesh and Halliday 2015).  
In what follows, I review the way that social scientific expertise around radicalization has 
contributed to the construction of insecurity and a pre-emptive creep through the category of 
radicalization, and review its consequences in the making of radical Islam and authorizing 
and legitimizing practices against Muslims.   
Radicalization: The Making of Insecurity and Radical Islam  
The category of “brainwashing” provides one historical parallel that highlights the subtle and 
often indirect consequences of social scientific categories in generating insecurity around 
religion in wider society. The term “brainwashing” originated in the study of American 
prisoners of war in the 1950s during the Korean War and sought to explain why prisoners 
adopted communist views. The empirical basis for the category was limited, as only 25 of the 
3000 prisoners of war refused repatriation, but it was later used to explain why people joined 
New Religious Movements (NRMs) or “cults” in the 1970s and 80s (Arweck 2006, 45). The 
term brainwashing was “the most characteristic feature of coverage of cults in the 1970s” and 
often reported as fact in news media and it came to signify deception, victimization and threat 
(McCloud 2004, 136). Organizations devoted to counteracting the dangers of cults were 
formed, experts in deprogramming specialized in “aftercare” for those who left an NRM, and 
governments formed policies to limit the size and power of NRMs.  
Sociologists concerned with this period recognized that the term served little social scientific 
utility as it deprived individuals of a sense of personal agency, over-inflated the sense of risk 
associated with these movements, and neglected to situate the phenomenon within a broader 
social context (Beckford 1985, Barker 1984). The term is instead most remarkable for its 
wider effects in society and moral panics it reflected. Brainwashing served as a scientific 
category and explanation that fed into the perceived risks associated with these movements. 
There were, of course, some dangers associated with NRMs like the 1977 Jonestown 
massacre, but these were grossly overblown by the sensationalism around brainwashing and 
cult recruitment. Brainwashing instead served to demarcate boundaries around fringe, deviant 
and dangerous religion. This example of brainwashing has tenuous links to the contemporary 
concept of radicalization, but it illustrates how risk, religion, and social scientific concepts 
come to have profound impact on the construction of insecurities and in guiding security 
policies and practices. 
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Kundnani argues that radicalization is informed by predominantly psychological social 
scientific expertise that is mobilized about and against Muslims and Islam (2012). I 
summarize and expand upon his description of three ways that psychologically and social-
psychologically informed social scientific expertise contributes to a pre-emptive logic against 
Muslims.  
Cultural-Psychological frameworks continue the interest in terrorism research prior to 9/11 
by identifying generic psychological factors related to group dynamics and struggles with 
identity (Laqueur 2004). This framework identifies the psychological and sociological 
antecedents to terrorism, including deprivation (real or perceived), grievances, perceptions of 
injustice, feelings of frustration and threats to identity. These furnish part of a model that is 
applicable to a range of terrorisms, including Left and Right wing kinds. However, as 
Kundnani observes, marginalization and inequality are seen as precipitating factors, and are 
woven into the story of Muslims about lack of European integration, uncertainties related to 
modernity, and the erosion of traditional structures of authority. This places Muslims at a 
default level of risk for radicalization. Moghaddam’s staircase to terrorism model places 
these considerations on the “ground floor” (2005), seeding the imagination of a future where 
marginalization leads to the possibility of terrorism. As a more recent model for 
radicalization states: “deprived and stigmatized minority groups in Western society, in 
particular Muslims” may “engender radicalization and even terrorism” (Koomen and Van der 
Pligt 2016, 31). 
Theological definitions of radicalization rely on the specific tenets of beliefs and are 
inseparable from Islam and radicalization. Reports from the New York Police Departments 
and the Danish Ministry of Justice reflect definitions of radicalization that are dependent 
upon particular Islamic contents (Precht 2007, Silber and Bhatt 2007), where the fourth stage 
is “Jihadization.” Gartenstein-Ross and Grossman identify six behavioural manifestations of 
the radicalization process: 
the adoption of a legalistic interpretation of Islam, coming to trust only a select and 
ideologically rigid group of religious authorities, viewing the West and Islam as 
irreconcilably opposed, manifesting a low tolerance for perceived religious deviance, 
attempting to impose religious beliefs on others, and the expression of radical political 
views. (Gartenstein-Ross and Grossman April 2009, 18) 
Similarly, Jones and Smith argue that ideology alone is the driving force of violence, with a 
root in “spiritual sickness” (2014). Other considerations around “root causes”, including 
marginalization, group processes, or psychological processes, are red-herrings, they argue. 
These definitions of radicalization are inseparable from Islam in content.  
Theological-psychological approaches propose that specific theological thinking intersects 
with psychological or social psychological dispositions that contributes to violent extremism. 
These definitions are independent of particular contents, as different ideological systems 
could be injected into these models and a violent outcome may ensue. However, specific 
theological thinking is essential to the process. This lends these models, as in the work of 
Sageman and Wiktorowitcz, to rely on the particular forms of Islamic theology. Kundnani 
underscores an important connection between psycho-social models and religious beliefs 
where the embedding of theological radicalism with particular psychological alignments or 
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group dynamics serve as the root causes of radicalization (2012, 15). The questions of 
violence can ultimately only be answered theologically. 
More sophisticated models of radicalization have involved an interactive process between 
theological and social-psychological processes. Rather than “beliefs by themselves driving 
individuals to violence, the picture is one in which ideology becomes more extreme in 
response to a “cognitive opening”, and “identity crisis” or a group bonding process” 
(Kundnani 2012, 14). There is an “interdependence of theology with emotions, identity and 
group dynamics” (Kundnani 2012, 14). This is evident in Sageman’s work, where a “natural 
and intense loyalty to the group, inspired by a violent Salafi script, transformed alienated 
young Muslims into fanatic terrorists” (2011, 88). 
Identity processes, however, are subject to a spectrum of trajectories. Olivier Roy, for 
example, highlighted this in his “neo-fundamentalist” matrix and description of processes of 
re-Islamisation that underpin a range of contemporary Islamic identities, ranging from 
Richard Reid (a failed self-detonating Muslim convert), Mecca2Medina (a group of rap 
musicians), and Tariq Ramadan (a Muslim academic articulating a congenial “European 
Islam”) (Roy 2004). Even the theological foundations of a “Salafi outlook” fails to deliver the 
clarity needed for understanding violent radicalization (Hegghammer 2009).  
Moreover, the processes underscored in the psychological-theological models are similar to 
those undergone by religious converts, to Islam and other religions, including NRMs. In this 
context, the religious convert to Islam is disproportionately viewed with suspicion as there is 
overlap in the process (e.g. identity crisis, “cognitive opening”, distancing from family 
relations, and change of appearance and social affiliations). The systematization of 
knowledge into a model of radicalization, makes very ordinary psychological and social 
processes seem extraordinarily dangerous (at its most extreme, a “conveyor belt” to terrorism 
(Razzaque 2008)).  
To summarize, the category of radicalization, informed by psychological and often combined 
with theological expertise, suffers from a problem of specificity; it captures too much and 
therefore identifies nothing specific in the pre-emptive space along the pathway to 
radicalization. Instead, these overly expansive frameworks catch a host of “false positives” 
and justify sweeping measures that target Muslim communities. Governing through pre-
emption has severe consequences for those who are governed (Walklate and Mythen 2015, 
1116). As I explore next, these social scientific models authorize and legitimize this form of 
governance. 
The Problem with “Moderate” Religion  
The dualism between universal security (for all) and sectoral security (for “us”), with 
counter-terrorism practices favouring the latter, has “eroded the rights of members of Muslim 
communities to equal citizenship” (Mythen and Walklate 2016, 1115). Mythen and Walklate 
have described the deleterious consequences that young British Muslims feel as they navigate 
and negotiate experiences of stereotypes and the frustrations they feel as they consider 
themselves to be law-abiding citizens who are routinely treated as suspicious and whose 
beliefs are subject to scrutiny (2015). They describe how Muslims often undergo a process of 
securitized reflexivity, where patterns of action and behaviour are routinely restructured in 
view of security processes, for example, changing dress so as to not be seen as an extremist. 
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“Moderate” Islam has come to be defined against this backdrop of insecurity. To qualify as a 
“good” or “moderate” Muslim, Muslims must assert “Western” or “British” values. Speaking 
out against terrorist violence is incumbent upon all Muslims as a rite of passage to fully 
qualifying for citizenship and to allay suspicion. Silence or a failure to be perceived as fully 
integrating into Western societies leads to suspicion. Recent controversy around the necessity 
of “British values” furthers this trajectory.  
At stake here is entitlement to the full privileges of citizenship in Western democratic 
societies that includes the “citizenship of dissent” or expressing criticism. As Maira Sunaina 
has persuasively captured in the American context, Muslims are required to affirm Islam as a 
religion of peace and disavow violence as a prerequisite for Muslims to enter the public 
sphere: “The desire to perform good Muslim citizenship has altered identities and social 
relations within Muslim American communities after 9/11, and created divisiveness, mistrust, 
and suspicion related to questions of dissent and complicity” (Sunaina 2010, 50). The 
terminology of the “moderate” Muslim often inscribes boundaries around acceptable forms of 
identity and religion based on often narrow conceptions of national identity and marking 
otherness along racial and religious lines. 
Croft has similarly argued that the terms “moderate Muslim” and “radical Muslim” are part 
of broader social and cultural processes that have come to see Muslims as a threat (Croft 
2012, see also, Mamdani 2005). The terms service the work of defining and redefining 
national identity and allegiances. A moderate Muslim is applauded when she or he speaks out 
against violence and aligns broadly with “Western values” and is “integrated” in society; A 
moderate Muslim is considered a problem when she or he fails to respond to problems within 
the Muslim “community”. In both instances, boundaries are drawn around the Muslim 
community, which is presented as problematic and responsible for acts of violence. 
The terms “radical” and “moderate” are normative constructs that define boundaries around 
what it means to be a citizen of a Western nation. In the most fervent of these views Islam is 
constructed as intrinsically other and incompatible with the Western (or British or American) 
views. It presents challenges to the scope and possibilities of multicultural societies, framing 
the limits of belonging. The terminology around the “moderate Muslim” defines allegiances.  
At root in framing these allegiances lies the “slippery slope” of extremism and radicalization, 
a path or conveyor belt that defines, through social scientific models, risk and routes for pre-
emption. An alternative view of security and insecurity, however, is emerging from the prison 
and probation contexts which places trust, citizenship and inclusion at the forefront of 
practice. 
Trust-Building, Citizenship and Inclusion 
In this concluding section, I draw on two examples to illustrate a shift in thinking about 
security and insecurity from pre-emptive risk logic towards a prioritization of trust, 
citizenship and inclusion. The first is based on my recent fieldwork (with Alison Liebling and 
colleagues) in two high security English prisons on “locating trust in a climate of fear” 
(Liebling et al. 2015). The study sought to understand how prisons could foster trust and the 
consequences of trust (and distrust) for thinking about security, safety, staff-prisoner 
relationships, and for individual prisoners’ personhood, development and rehabilitation. Here 
I focus on the differing practices of two ways of practicing counter-terrorism in two prisons. 
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As a second example, I briefly examine emerging policy documents for managing extremist 
offenders and radicalization in prison and probation contexts. Together, these examples 
illustrate the need for and possibility of a new vocabulary for security and insecurity that 
requires a shift in the epicentre of expertise from the psychologically-laden focus of pre-
empting risk to a sociologically-driven focus on trust, citizenship and inclusion.  
Prisons and probation contexts have become important sites for developing policies and 
practices related to countering radicalization. This has followed from the links between 
people with criminal pasts and terrorist attacks (Basra, Neumann, and Brunner 2016, Hamm 
2013). Saïd and Chérif Kouachi, responsible for the Charlie Hebdo shooting in Paris in 
January, 2015, for example, had criminal pasts, and their time in prison was fundamental to 
their radicalization process. The rapid increase of the number of individuals arrested for 
terrorism-related offences has added to concerns around prisons being sites where 
radicalization can occur as these individuals may join the mainstream prisoner population and 
have an adverse influence on others. The numbers of individuals arrested for jihadist 
terrorism in Europe has grown, with figures between 2013 – 2015 showing an increase from 
216 to 687 (excluding UK figures; Europol 2016, 2014). 
In my recent fieldwork in two English high security prisons, counter-terrorism practice varied 
widely. The two prisons presented a different model of practice. Broadly-speaking, one took 
a risk-based approach and the other took a trust-based approach. At the time of the research, 
offenders convicted for terrorism-related offences were imprisoned alongside the mainstream 
prisoner population and there were concerns over their influence over other prisoners. The 
risks of radicalization were layered onto the day to day risks that prison staff manage in a 
high security prison. Each prison, however, had a different approach to understanding 
radicalization.  
In one prison, counter-terrorism practice was characterized by the effort to understand early 
warning “signs” or markers of radicalization, and this contributed to a narrow view of what 
radicalization involved. Staff were interested in determining the “signs” of radicalization, and 
these signs were marked in individual prisoners apart from an understanding of the features 
of the prison environment, the penal context, and a broader view of prisoners’ experiences, 
life histories and narratives. Prisoners and staff described the types of activity that were 
considered suspicious, and this was often intimately tied with Islamic identity and practice. 
Inquiries about Islam (“Mr. Abu inquired about being a Muslim”), or aspects of religious 
practice (“He was witnessed praying in a cell with two other prisoners”), was viewed as 
behaviour related to the risk of radicalization. 
In the second prison, staff operated through a different understanding of radicalization. 
Counter-terrorism practice involved building trust. Counter-terrorism staff, for example 
introduced themselves in a transparent manner to offenders convicted for terrorist-related 
offences, letting them know of their role and responsibilities. Trust was recognized as integral 
to security practices as it enabled closer relationships with prisoners and therefore a higher 
quality of information and intelligence gathering. Distrust undermined the practice of security 
and it meant that information could be unreliable. Staff also recognized that extremism and 
radicalization cuts across ideologies. Right wing extremists were a concern alongside Islamist 
extremism, reflecting the view that radicalization, and attempts to curb it, involve models of 
practice underpinned by a deep understanding of the social and relational climates of prisons.  
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There was recognition that the social context and prisoner dynamics could heighten 
polarization within the prison. The prison was seen as a micro-society, where tensions 
between communities could flare up and far right extremism and Islamic extremism were 
intimately tied. This reflected a broader, sociological and relational understanding of 
radicalization attuned to social dynamics and their complex interplay. It reflected a particular 
approach to counter-radicalization that was less focussed on clear-cut psychological or 
theological markers of individual risks related to pathways to radicalization. Part of the 
remedy to lessening the risks around radicalization that was expressed within this second 
prison, and is becoming widely acknowledged across Europe, is that attention to healthy 
prison environments, including those that reflect fairness and equality, safety and good 
relationships between staff and prisoners, are the primary means for preventing radicalization 
in prison (United Nations October 2016). 
A focus on trust in prison and probation contexts is evident in a number of monitoring 
procedures and risk management practices found in recent European handbooks for policy-
makers and practitioners, including ones by the Council of Europe (Council of Europe 2016), 
the United Nations (United Nations October 2016), and the European Commission (Williams 
2017). The primary means to prevent radicalization, the reports highlight, includes attention 
to the conditions of the prison environment, upholding human rights and placing the end goal 
of rehabilitation and reintegration at the forefront of practice: 
The most powerful weapon in the fight against radicalization in prisons is without a 
doubt a humane detention policy that respects the fundamental rights of the detainees 
and focuses indefatigably on rehabilitation and reintegration. Therefore, a custodial 
sentence or measure has to executed under psychosocial, physical and material 
conditions that respect the dignity of the human person, has to render the preservation 
or growth of the self-respect of the detainee possible and has to appeal to their 
individual and social responsibility. (United Nations October 2016, 2; emphasis 
added).  
In the management of offenders post-release, there are similar developments among 
probation officers throughout Europe that recognize that integration is the primary goal for 
extremist offenders and to decrease the risks of radicalization among offenders post-release. 
This offers only a brief glimpse of a changing outlook to security and insecurity, but in view 
of the perils of dominant approaches grounded in psychological and theological expertise 
identified above that contribute to the marginalization of Muslims and ethnic minority 
groups, it is a compelling and necessary one that demands attention.  
What is remarkable about exploring counter-terrorism practice in prison and probation 
settings is that trust and a broader view of who offenders can become as citizens occupies a 
place on the forefront of priorities. In the contexts of greatest insecurity—work involving 
individuals convicted for offences that include terrorism crimes and those considered 
vulnerable to radicalization—security is sought through building trust, allowing for 
opportunities for individuals to demonstrate trustworthiness, recognizing human dignity and 
the possibilities for individuals to change and grow, with a wider view into reintegrating 
individuals into society as citizens. Insecurity arises from distrust, dehumanization, and 
marginalizing others and exclusion.  
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This shift in thinking about security, I suggest, requires a knowledge foundation different 
from that produced from case studies of terrorists, terrorist acts and process models arrived at 
through a psychologically-driven social science of radicalization. It requires a sociological 
turn that is attentive to the practices of institutions, the relationships between individuals in 
society and between communities, and an appeal to understand the functioning of more 
inclusive and cooperative societies.  
For the foreseeable future, security and insecurity will be driven by questions around 
citizenship and the cruel dynamic of inclusion and exclusion. Counter-terrorism policy and 
practice will require a corresponding shift in knowledge expertise. 
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